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INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL PROCEDURES
IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Ernest Gellhorn* and Paul B. Larsen**

I.

INTRODUCTION

administrative hearings take many forms, agency rules of
practice necessarily vary. One of the original justifications for
creating administrative agencies was to promote the development
of individual procedural responses to particular regulatory needs.
Obviously, the procedures in an unfair labor practice case have little
in common with those in utility rate proceedings. Hence, it would
be counterproductive to straight-jacket the proceedings of one with
the rules of the other. Nevertheless, comparable agency problems
may lend themselves to a uniform response. Interlocutory appeal
practices for reviewing a hearing examiner's interim rulings fall
into this category.1
The advantages of immediate agency review of an examiner's
interlocutory rulings are manifold. It avoids the manifest waste of
time and money that results from the parties being forced to await
the examiner's initial decision and then having the challenged
ruling, which was made at the outset of the proceeding, reversed.
Even if a rehearing is not ordered, the cost of the unnecessary trial
is obvious. Moreover, interlocutory review assures that trial rulings
are correct. It affords examiners guidance on procedural questions
when most needed--especially since procedural issues tend to be
buried in the final appeal. In other words, an interlocutory appeal
may satisfy the demands of fairness prior to the final appeal.
However, the costs of interlocutory appeal may readily offset its
gains. An interim appeal can either immediately delay the proceeding or ultimately have a delaying effect. The appeal interrupts the
proceeding, interferes with the examiner's control of the case, wastes
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time and money if the only consequence of the appeal is to affirm
the examiner's ruling, and distracts the review authority from more
important policy functions. Even worse, a costly interlocutory appeal
may be unnecessary if the challenged issue becomes moot or nonprejudicial as a result of the initial decision. Not only might single
appeals from the initial decision be more economical, but the review
authority may also be unable to review interlocutory issues adequately if the question is premature.
There are, therefore, substantial arguments for and against permitting interlocutory review of an examiner's rulings. With so even
a balance in principle, factual analysis of agency practices becomes
critical. This study measures agency practice against the standard
that hearing procedures must be fair, and unnecessary delay is as
unfair to the parties and the public as are arbitrary and erroneous
interlocutory rulings.

II.

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

A.

Scope and Methodology

With these considerations in mind, we reviewed the interlocutory
appeal case records and rules of six federal agencies. Of the
major independent agencies, the study covered all except the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which was omitted because it
does not maintain separate interlocutory review records. 2 The ICC's
position is not as unusual as this comment might suggest. Even
though interlocutory appeals are frequent in many agencies, only the
Federal Communications Commission maintains summary statistics
identifying the number of appeals, the delay (if any) that they cause,
and the decisions of the revie-wing authority. Consequently, we had
to develop most of the data reported here from the agencies' records.
The data collected are not precisely comparable since the agencies'
methods of maintaining their files and case records differ. Nevertheless, we were able to gather sufficient information to present a
description of the operation of each agency's interlocutory review
procedure.
·
This study covers agency performance during three fiscal years,
beginning with 1968. In addition to examining each agency's rules of
practice, we reviewed the records of those agency hearings presided
2. After a brief sampling of the Interstate Commerce Commission's [hereinafter
ICC] case records, we recognized that we could not obtain a worthwhile representative
sampling of its massive caseload without inordinate effort-nor could we fill the
information gap by conducting individual interviews or by making a selective review
of the ICC's records,
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over by a hearing examiner in ·which the examiner's ruling was subjected to interlocutory review. Initially, we concentrated on basic
statistics, such as the number of hearings, the frequency of interlocutory review, the delays caused, and the review authority's decisions on appeal. The collection of follow-up data depended upon
the pattern that the basic data disclosed. To these quantitative
measures, we added qualitative impressions garnered from interviews with review authorities, hearing examiners, staff attorneys, and
private practitioners. Our primary objective was to measure the
impact of different procedures on interlocutory review. We recognized, of course, that other variables (e.g., the type of hearing, the
quality of agency personnel, the importance of the ultimate decision
to the parties) have a bearing on each agency's performance. We
identified these variables and sought to assess their individual impact.

B.

Current Interlocutory Review Procedures
and Their Impact
I. Federal Communications Commission

Trial-type hearings at the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) usually involve broadcast applications, renewals, or transfers.
These are essentially licensing proceedings, with disputed issues arising when more than one applicant seeks the same license or when
either the staff or another licensee objects or, as happens occasionally,
when a representative of the community opposes the application.3
However, many FCC hearings are almost indistinguishable from
complaint cases. The latter are primarily disciplinary actions seeking
to revoke a station's operating license. Here delay usually favors the
challenged party since the license continues until the proceeding is
concluded.
Until November 1970, the FCC freely allowed interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings through an intermediate appellate review board. 4 The Commission's experience with this liberal practice
was remarkable. Hearings were not inordinately disrupted or delayed, nor was the time of agency members unnecessarily consumed.
Nevertheless, FCC interlocutory appeals as a matter of right are now
restricted to a few particularly sensitive questions and interlocutory
review by the Review Board is primarily within the examiner's dis3. Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] examiners also preside
over other types of rate and licensing hearings.
4. For a careful analysis of the FCC's review board, see Freedman, Review Boards
in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 546 (1969).
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cretion. The Board also issues interlocutory rulings on questions
beyond the examiner's authority. These rulings on direct petition,
as well as the Board's rulings on appeal from interlocutory orders
issued by examiners, are appealable to the Commission. Serious delay
or disruption has not occurred under this revised procedure.
During the three :fiscal years under study, the FCC's rules govetning appeals from an examiner's intetlocutory rulings provided
that "[a]ny party to a hearing proceeding n1ay :file an appeal from an
adverse ruling ... [to] the Review Board."6 Review Board decisions
were appealable to the Commission under the same standard. The
only formal restriction imposed on interlocutory appeals appeared
in a Commission note (appended to the rules) urging parties to defer
appeals unless the ruling "is fundamental and affects the conduct of
the entire case." 6 Consequently, the failure to appeal would delay
but not waive any objections except those objections that become
moot if not pressed immediately. The rules made no provision for
postponing the hearing pending the interlocutory appeal, although
they did allow the presiding officer and the Review Board discretion
to stay an order.7 As a matter of practice, examiners generally have
not postponed hearings pending an interlocutory appeal. However,
this result may have followed from the fact that discovery or posthearing questions constituted a significant portion of the FCC's interlocutory appeals and the hearings were not then in session. The FCC
Review Board's time has been consumed more by direct petitions on
interlocutory matters outside the examiners' province than by appeals from examiner rulings. "[P]etitions to amend, modify, enlarge,
or delete the issues in cases of adjudications" are for the Review
Board and not the examiner.8
The statistics on interlocutory appeals relating to the scope or
conduct of adjudicatory hearings at the FCC during the three fiscal
years studied are shown in Table I. These statistics require some ex•
planation. On the one hand, the number of interlocutory rulings by
examiners shown in Table I is inflated because it includes routine
n1atters that are never appealed (e.g., the Chief Examiner's designa5. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1970), as amended, FCC Report 8.: Order 70-1193 (1970), 47
C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1971).
6. 47 C.F.R. § 1.301, Note (1970), as amended, FCC Report & Order 70-1193, 35 Fed.
Reg. 17333 (1970).
7. 47 C.F.R. § l.301(e) (1970), as amended, FCC Report 8.: Order 70-1193 (1970), 47
C.F.R. § 1.30l(c) (1971). Cf. 47 C.F.R. § l.115(h) (1971).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2!H(a)(2) (1971). The Board acts on numerous other interlocutory
matters (e.g., petitions to extend time, to reconsider, to correct the transcript) unre•
lated to the conduct of the adjudicatory hearing before the examiner. Id. These rulings
are not considered here.
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TABLE 19
!NTERLOCUTORY .APPEALS IN

Interlocutory rulings by examiners
interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings
(to Review Board)
Direct interlocutory petitions (to Review Board)
Interlocutory appeals to FCC
Adjudications disposed of by hearing
Adjudications pending at end of fiscal year
Adjudications docketed

FCd

:HEARINGS

1968

Fiscal Year
1969

1970

1856

1690

1914

41
179
30
131
134
206

26
133
33

48
128
23

no

147
134

113
168
128

tion of examiners). On the other hand, many controversial inter•
locutory rulings issued by an examiner are not reflected because the
ruling was not formalized or no interim appeal WciS songht (e.g.,
rulings to admit or reject evidence during a heating). Moreover, it
is not true that every hearing involves at least one interlocutory inter•
ruption (as might be concluded from this table), since there often
is :tnore than one· appeal in a proceeding.
Even when adjusted, the number of direct petitions and interlocutory appeals does not adequately reflect the actual sitnation.
Direct petitions, of --which there are relatively many, seldom impede
adjudicatory hearings. Hearings usually are not postponed pending
the Board's decision, and most petitions (e.g., to add or amend issues
to be determined) are filed shortly after the case is first assigned to
the examiner; thus they seldom occasion serious delay. Although
more apt to cause delay, interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings
do not appear excessive. Of the 48 appeals filed in fiscal 1970, the
Review· Board reversed the examiner in 20% of the cases. The
benefits of these appeals appear substantial.10 The parties are assured
a fairer hearing--one tried in accordance with the Commission's
rules and policies. Moreover, the cost of these appeals does not seem
very high. In over 90% of the FCC's hearings, ho delay or expense
is incurred because no interlocutory appeal is filed. 11 It has not been
9. These statistics were supplied by the Review Board and the Chief Hearing
Examiner, We have excluded~ven from "direct interlocutory petitions"-requests
made directly to the Review Board that do not directly affect the adjudication (e.g.,
petitions for extensions of time on appeal to the Review Board, petitions to reopen
the record, and petitions to reconsider the Board's decision).
IO. See, e.g., Harrison Radio, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970); Citizens Cable Co.,
19 F.C.C.2d 907 (1969); East St. Louis Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C.G.2d 212 (1967).
ll. In connection with the November 1970 rule change, the chairman of the FCC
Review Board made a detailed analysis of interlocutory appeals during the second
half of fiscal 1970. While 22 appeals were processed by the Board, they involved only
15 proceedings. During this time approximately 200 docket proceedihgs were :tssigned
to the FCC's examiners. Thus, less than 8% of all adjudications assigned to examiners
during this period were subject to interlocutory interference.
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suggested that unsuccessful appeals are frivolous or undesirable; indeed, an affirmation of the examiner's decision may enhance his
standing and performance. The delay resulting from an unsuccessful
interlocutory appeal is unlikely to be significant since the hearing
generally is not postponed and the Review Board usually decides
the question within 60 days.12 Moreover, as the statistics demonstrate,
the Commission seldom interferes with the Board's disposition of
interlocutory questions.13
Despite this successful record, the FCC did amend its rules of
practice to restrict interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Except
for sensitive orders rejecting claims of privilege, making confidential
records available, or terminating a person's right to participate in a
hearing, interlocutory appeals can now be heard by the Review
Board only if allowed by the examiner.14 In the awkward phrasing
of the FCC's rule, the examiner shall permit an appeal if it "presents
an important question of law or policy as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . the ruling is such
that error would be likely to require remand should the appeal be
deferred and raised as an exception."15 Questions subject to discretionary review can still be postponed and raised on a party's appeal
from the examiner's initial decision.16 However, if the appeal exists
as a matter of right, the issue is waived unless pressed immediately.17
This rule amendment is curious in view of the FCC's experience
with interlocutory review. If any problem existed, it was with discovery appeals, which occasionally seemed unworthy of review,18 and
with the procedure that allowed the parties to by-pass the examiner
on many questions. The new rule, however, goes beyond appeals
from discovery rulings, and it does not require that all interlocutory
issues be considered first by the examiner. The FCC justifies the
amendment on the grounds that it expedites hearings "by strengthening the position of the presiding officer, by cutting down on hearing delays occasioned by consideration of appeals which should be
deferred pending action on the merits, and by freeing the Review
12. The average time between the filing of an interlocutory appeal and the Review
Board's decision during 1968 was 54 days, during 1969, 54.5 days, and during 1970, 58.5
days.
13. During the eight-year history of the Review Board (Aug. I, 1962-June 30, 1970),
the FCC granted only 36 petitions for review-and this figure includes several matters
beyond the scope of what we have included in interlocutory review.
14. 47 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1971).
15. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b) (1971).
16. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b)(l) (1971).
17. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1971).
18. E.g., Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 23 F.C.C.2d 162 (1970).
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Board to spend its resources" elsewhere.19 Staff proponents readily
concede that the arguments for eliminating needless hearing delays
and for reallocating Review Board resources are make-weights-as
is indicated by the relatively trouble-free operation of the open appeal procedure. The main justification, then, for sunendering the
benefits of Board supervision (at least when the examiner refuses
the appeal request) and restricting appeals much in the manner of
the federal courts is to enhance the position, power, and prestige
of the Commission's hearing officers. That there are some grounds
for this rationale cannot be gainsaid. Although such evaluations are
necessarily subjective, most observers concede that, as the FCC has
granted additional authority to its examiners, their self-respect, professional stature, and performance have improved. Whether the
power to deny interlocutory appeals from most evidentiary and procedural rulings will further enhance the examiners' status is less
clear. Currently, examiners are upheld in 80% of all interlocutory
appeals.20 The effect of such approbation would appear to be substantial. Indeed, it is not clear that examiners would relinquish such
approval by denying interlocutory requests. It is possible under the
new discretionary review procedure for the examiner to certify only
those rulings that he believes (and probably knows) will be upheld
and to deny permission to appeal from questionable rulings that
might be reversed.
On the other hand, the record does not justify any assumption
that examiners will use their new powers, either consciously or unconsciously, in so deceptive a manner. Experience with the new rule
will ultimately provide an answer. For the present, an educated
guess suggests that the impact of the new rule will be minimal,
especially since the parties retain the right to appeal or to by-pass
the examiner on the most important interlocutory questions.21 This
point was underscored by the Federal Communications Bar, which
reluctantly supported the rule change after it was modified to expand the automatic review provisions for claims of privilege, because
"in extraordinary circumstances involving obvious and serious error,
parties could petition the Commission for waiver of thr [sic]
rule ...." 22
19. FCC Report&: Order 70-1193, ,I 6, 35 Fed. Reg. 17333 (1970).
20. During fiscal 1970, the Review Board reversed examiners on 9 out of 48 interlocutory appeals.
21. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
22. FCC Preliminary Report &: Order 3 (submitted Oct. 7, 1970), on file with the
Michigan Law Review. This justification, interestingly enough, was deleted from the
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Despite this expansion of the examiner's authority, the FCC's
rules are still overly restrictive. On the one hand, the examiner is
not authorized to rule on all interlocutory questions once the matter
is assigned to him despite the fact that he is most familiar with the
case. His views should be obtained before the Review Board acts on
the appeal. Moreover, a ruling by the examiner may avoid unnecessary appeals to the Review Board. On the other hand, if applied
strictly, the new standard for determining whether an interlocutory
appeal should be allowed may be unfair. The standard requires a
three-step test: the issue must (a) involve an important question in
the mind of the examiner, (b) be unresolved under Commission precedent, and (c) result in prejudicial error if incorrectly decided. 23
The standard seemingly excludes equally important questions deserving Review Board consideration. For example, consider a question that will become moot by the time the Review Board hearing is
held (and thus remand is unlikely). Or consider rulings that, while
not rising to the level of prejudicial error, are of substantial importance to the aggrieved party. We suspect that examiners are likely
to certify these and other questions despite the rule language. If our
estimate is accurate, practical accommodations would not forestall
the rewriting of these awkward rules.
2. Federal Power Commission

Viewed superficially, Federal Power Commission (FPC) hearings
appear similar to those of the FCC. Thus, it seems surprising that
substantially fewer interlocutory appeals are filed at the FPC. In
both agencies, hearings involve either license applications or rate
requests. Each agency operates with approximately 15 examiners,
whose decisions often determine the future positions of the participating businesses. Yet the FPC holds fewer than half the number
of hearings the FCC does.24 And the FPC seldom allows interlocutory
appeals from examiner rulings, whereas, until last November, the
FCC allowed appeals as a matter of right.
The difference is not attributable to the personnel or to the rules
of each agency, even though they differ. It lies, rather, in their basic
work. Rate requests are the most frequently contested type of FPC
FCC's final report even though the Commission discussed the Federal Communications
Bar Association Committee's support in its order. 35 Fed. Reg. 17332-33 (1970).
23. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b) (1971).
24. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRAcrICE &: PROC., SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88th CONG., 2D SESS., STATlsnCAL DATA RE!.Atto 1'0 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEED•
JNcs 27-30, 35-38 (Comm. Print 1964) (Part II of the "Statistical Greenbook").
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hearings-at least when measured by hearing days. These hearings
tend to be complex, extended affairs concentrating on the economic
condition of the parties and the industry and usually involve technical evidence. Little attention is paid to the personal histories of
the company officers, and issues of credibility are rare. FPC hearings
frequently involve expert evaluation, which makes it difficult for
a reviewing authority to obtain an adequate grasp of the context in
which the examiner issued his ruling without inordinate study of
the record. Discovery is not significant in FPC practice and individual
rulings are less likely to require remand or retrial of the entire case.
In essence, the issues and evidence at FPC hearings discourage interlocutory review.2 5
Eve;n though FPC hearings are not subject to significa;nt interlocutory appeal and the Commission keeps no statistics on interlocutory review, its rules are worth noting. Interlocutory appeals to the
Commission are authorized only "in extraordinary circumstances
where prompt decision by the Commission is necessary to prevent
detriment to the public interest."26 The examiner determines whether
"extraordinary circumstances" exist.27 Certification by the examiner
neither assures the appealing party that review will be granted nor
substantially delays the proceeding since the interlocutory petition
"shall be deemed to have been denied" unless the FPC acts upon it
within 30 days. 28 The FPC's protest rule, which allows anyone to
file a protest "to alert the Commission and the parties to a proceeding
of the fact and nature of the protestant's objection,1' 29 can be used to
seek direct interlocutory relief from the Commission if an examiner
25. FCC hearings, on the contrary, usually present a different situation. Except
for common carrier rate hearings (which are basically indistinguishable from Federal
Power Commission· [hereinafter FPC] rate requests), most contested FCC hearings involve competing applications for a broadcast license, even in renewal or revocation
hearings, Only occasional attenpon is given to industry conditions or economic
evidence in broadcast hearings, other than consideration of the soundness of the
applicant's financial condition. Instead, the hearings concentrate on the applicant's
past record or prospect and frequently include a review of individual actions over
several years. That is, the evidence presented in most FCC hearings is less complex.
and voluminous than that adduced before FPC examiners.
26. 18 C.F.R. § 1.28(a) (1971). Until November 1968, this strict limitation was not
applicable to appeals from an examiner's ruling at a preheating conference. FPC Order
141, 12 Fed. Reg. 8480 (1947), as amended, FPC Order 217, 24 Fed. Reg. 9473 (1959).
Tile FPC abolished this distinction, however, so that all interlocutory appeals are now
subject to Rule l.28(a) without regard to whether the examiner's ruling was made
during the-hearing-or at a preheating-conference. FPC Order 373, 33 Fed. Reg. 17174
(1968).
27. 18 C.F.R. § 1.28(a) (1971).
28. l8 C,F.R. § l.28(c) (1971).
29. 18 C.F.R. § 1.IO(b) (1971).
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unreasonably refuses to certify a question. Direct appeals, however,
are exceedingly rare.
While FPC hearings may not provoke as many interlocutory questions as do the proceedings of other agencies, staff attorneys and practitioners concede that questions of discovery or evidence can raise
serious objections. The practice, however, is to rely upon the appeals
from the examiner's final decision to present any objections that
might have been raised on interlocutory review. The FPC Bar, which
assisted in drafting the FPC rules, is a relatively small group;
thus most practitioners appearing before an examiner have, or expect
to have, other cases before the Commission. Consequently, it is difficult to penetrate the resulting consensus toward postponing appeals.
It appeared to us that FPC examiners and the FPC Bar have reached
a practical (if unacknowledged) accommodation on the procedures
for deciding interlocutory questions.
3. Civil Aeronautics Board

Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) hearings fall primarily into two
areas, licensing (route applications) and rate-making (tariff filings).
Board proceedings are often lengthy and complex. Economic evidence is predominant and voluminous. Hence, CAB hearings parallel
FPC proceedings, with the exception that the topics differ. The
former relate solely to air transportation, while the latter regulate
the supply of electric and gas energy. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the CAB's procedure for interlocutory review of examiner rulings is similar to the FPC's approach. The only significant difference
between the two is that, although the FPC still hears an occasional
appeal, the CAB, as a matter of practice, hears none.
While the CAB's rules continue to authorize interlocutory review, they do so only "in extraordinary circumstances and with the
consent of the examiner."30 Even then the appeal will be disallowed
unless the examiner finds that interlocutory review "is necessary to
prevent substantial detriment to the public interest or undue prejudice to any party."31 Not surprisingly, examiners do not find that
their challenged rulings will cause substantial detriment to the
public or will unduly prejudice one of the parties.32 Even if the
examiners were to become more critical of their own rulings, the
30. 14 C.F.R. § 302.18(£) (1971).
31. 14 C.F.R. § 302.18(£) (1971).
32. The examiner's authority to set the time for filing intel"locutory appeal briefs
(when he consents to a review) also reflects his position in the CAB, 14 C.F,R, § 302,18(£)
(1971).
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CAB has made it clear that interlocutory review is exceptional and
is merited only when the examiner agrees that his ruling should be
reviewed and finds that the appeal is necessary.33 As the Board admonished in Southwestern Area Local-Service Case,34 "Rule 18(£) is
designed to discourage and avoid interlocutory appeals except in
extraordinary circumstances and in strict conformity to its provisions."30
The CAB maintains no index of interlocutory appeals. If a party
requests an interlocutory review, that request is made orally to the
examiner and will be denied without a written order; however, the
request is preserved in the hearing record. The CAB's examiners and
staff, as well as the private bar, generally assert that objections to
interlocutory rulings are adequately considered in the review of the
examiner's recommended decision by the Board. Private practitioners, however, confidentially note that they are subject to considerable restraint in seeking interlocutory review. Because relatively few attorneys practice before the CAB, their relationship with
the examiners must be a continuing one. Route determinations are
sophisticated questions, in the resolution of which the examiner
exercises wide discretion. As a result, private attorneys practicing before the CAB evidence a reluctance to press procedural objections
in the face of the examiners' expressed dislike for interlocutory review. On the other hand, these same practitioners concede that discovery is not a significant problem in CAB hearings.36 Because of
extensive reporting requirements, information is readily available,
and discovery is normally granted if additional information is needed
from other parties or from the Board's files. Thus, many of the
critical procedural rulings often challenged by interlocutory appeal
in other agencies are simply not present in CAB hearings. The situation, in other words, parallels our view of FPC practices.

4. Securities and Exchange Commission
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) attention focuses primarily on the regulation by informal means of the
issuance and trading of securities, two types of formal administrative
33. In addition to imposing strict tests for reviewability, the rules provide that
the interlocutory review shall not include oral argument unless the ·CAB so directs,
and that the review does not automatically postpone the hearing. 14 G.F.R. §§ 302.IS(f),
(g) (1971).
34. 32 C.A.B. 1375 (1961).
35. 32 C.A.B. at 1375.
36. Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures Before the C.A.B., 18 Ao. L. REv. 157
(1966).
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hearings do arise under the SEC statutes. The first resembles a licensing procedure and involves an application by a person othenvise
subject to this Commission's jurisdiction for exemption from (or
approval pursuant to) specific regulatory requirements. Typical examples are applications under section 17(b) of the Investment Company Act of 194037 for permission to effect transactions between
"certain affiliated persons,"38 or for declarations concerning the issu4nce of securiti(;!s under section 7 of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935.311
The second type of proceeding before the SEC is a complaint
hearing instituted by the Commission's allegation that the respondent failed to abide by one of the .securities acts or regulations. The
most frequent of these involve disciplinary action against a brokerdealer and associated individuals under sections 15(b)(5) and (7) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 Another example of this type
of SEC hearing is a stop-order proceeding under the Securities Act
of 1933.11 The licensing procedure is frequently adversary in nature,
but the complaint pr-0ceeding more closely resembles a judicial trial.
Interlocutory review of examiner rulings is occasionally sought in each.
The history of the SEC hearing examiner's position in the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings-and in the making of interlocutory rulings-reflects the increasing authority given presiding officers
in most federal agencies as well as the increasing delegation of
authority to employee boards or individuals below the commission
level. Since the SEC's experience has been successful, and since it
supports the experience of other well-managed agencies, we have
spelled out the procedural changes in some detail with the design
that the SEC's record might encourage other agencies to follow its
lead.
Initially, the examiner's authority at the SEC was limited,1 2
Parties frequently sought an interlocutory ruling from the Commission because the question was beyond the scope of the examiner's
pow~r to rule. Th«;!n, in 1960, the SEC expanded the hec;1ring officer's
authority to rule on motions m 4de during the course of a hearing.
Motions were to be addressed to t,he e:µmi:Q.er, not the Commission,
37. 15 U.S.C. § 80-,al7{b) (1964).
38. 15 U.S.C. § ,80-a17 (1964).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 79g (1964). Also included among the licensing type hearings would
be applications for the extension of unlisted trading privileges under § 12(f) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(£) (1954).
40, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5), (7) (1964).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b), (d} (1964),
42. See generally 3 L. Loss, S£CURITIEs REGULATION 1910·11 (2d ed. 1961),
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and he was to rule upon them.4 ~ When a party excepted to a ruling
by the examiner during the hearing, the examiner was to certify
the challenge as requested to the Commission if he found "(1) that
there [was] at issue a privilege not to answer questions posed; or
(2) that a subsequent reversal of the ruling by the .Commission would
unduly delay or prolong the proceeding or cause undue inconvenience to the parties, taking into consicleration the probability of such
reversal."44 If the examiner determined that the test for certification
was not met, a party could apply to the Commission for review, or
the Commission could direct, on its own motion, that the matter be
submitted to it. In any event, the hearing was to continue unless
the examiner ordered othenvise.45
The rules were further amended in 1964 to authori;I::!;! hearin.g
officers to consider and rule on not only all motions made during
the course of the hearing but also most prehearing motions.46 .More
importantly, the Commission gave greater effect to interlocutory
rulings by examiners by prescribing more restrictive conditions for
appeals. 47 Objections generally have to be made first to the hearing
examiner. In addition, the examiner is not to certify a ruling for
interlocutory review unless (a) a party so requests and (b) the exam,iner finds that a subsequent reversal of this ruling would (::ause
"unusual delay or expense'' or that the ruling would compel disclosure of confidential SEC files or testimony from Commission personnel.48 Furthermore, the Director of the Office of Opinions and
Review (the SEC's counterpart of the Review Boards utilized by the
ICC and FCC) was delegated authority to affirm interlocutory rnJings
by the examiner.49 Only the SEC can reverse an examiner's int!;!rlocutory ruling, but it does not receive the matter until the Director
indicates that he will not affirm the examiner. There are a few items
beyond the examiner's authority that must be presented .directly .to
43. SEC Rule XII(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 6731-32 (1960), as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 29l.12
(1971).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Securities Act Release No. 33-4674 (March 20, 1964), 17 C.F.R. § 201.12(a) (1971).
47. 17 C,F.R. § 201.12(a) (1971).
48. 17 C.F,R. § 201.12(a) (1971). The overriding standard is established in the first
sentence of the Commission's curre.nt rules: "The Commission will not review a ruling
of the hearing officer prior to its consideration of the entire proceeding in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances." Id.
49. 17 C.F.R". §§ 200.30-6(a)(l)(i)-(ii) (1971), pursuant to Act of Aui. 20, 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-592, §§ 1-2, 76 Stat. 394-95, codified at 11> p.s,c. ~§ 7!ld-I; i:l-2 (1964). See
S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962). If he finds it appropriate, the Director may submit a case to the Commission
even though he would affirm the e.'Caminer's ruling.
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the Commission (e.g., applications to intervene and requests to add or
delete issues). 50 In line with these developments, the SEC has liberalized its discovery rules. 51
The statistics on SEC hearings and interlocutory appeals are
shown in Table II. As Table II indicates, despite a substantial caseload, there are few interlocutory appeals in SEC proceedings.
TABLE II
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS IN

SEC

HEARINGS

Fiscal Year
Interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings
Direct interlocutory action (to SEC only)
Adjudications pending (workload)
Adjudications disposed of
without hearing
after hea1ing
Adjudications docketed

1968

1969

1970

4
4
147

4
4
225

4

300

53
21
58

6'i
19
152

107
44
158

s

Because the number of interlocutory appeals was so small and the
SEC's records ·were carefully indexed, we were able to review the
record in each case. The pertinent summary of the records in the
16 cases in which interlocutory review of hearing examiner rulings
was pursued appears in Table III. The interval between the filing
by the parties of their request for certification or petition for review
TABLE III
SUM:MARY OF RECORDS IN INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

Nature of examiner ruling
Evidentiary
Discovery
Procedural
Bias
Examiner ruling on review request
Certified
Not certified

5
11

16

Ruling of review authority
Director, 0 &: R
Affirming
Reversing/Modifying

10

SEC
3

7

• Several interlocutory appeals involved more than one ruling or issue; consequently,
the totals vary.
50. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.11, .12(b) (1971).
51. See Frankhauser &: Bellman, The Right to lnformatio11 in the Administrative
Process: A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 An. L. REv. 101 (1969).
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and the disposition of the matter by the Commission or by the Director averaged 25 days, with a fourth of this time consumed by
briefing and oral argument. In every instance, the hearing delay
resulting from interlocutory review was inconsequential, for in none
of the proceedings in which an appeal was prosecuted during the
hearing was the trial postponed. It is less clear, however, whether
the prehearing appeals affected the time schedule. Interlocutory
appeals are usually sought by respondents. The Commission and the
Director have not been reluctant to reverse the examiners (although
the examiners were upheld in a majority of appeals). 52 However, in
general, parties have been deterred from pressing interlocutory appeals. The picture with respect to direct interlocutory actions to the
Commission during these three fiscal years (1968-1970) is similar to
that of interlocutory appeals. None of the actions-which involved
questions beyond the examiner's authority and, therefore, had not
been ruled upon by him-directly contributed to delay. Most were
prehearing motions (usually to alter the scope of the hearing) and the
others (procedural complaints or third-party attempts to intervene)
did not cause the hearing to be postponed. 03 On the other hand, it
seems likely that hearings might have been scheduled earlier had no
interlocutory appeal been taken or had the issue been ruled upon
by the examiner.
The sum and substance of this analysis, therefore, is that interlocutory review of examiner rulings has been handled sensibly and
expeditiously by the SEC. At first glance, it might seem inconsistent
to require examiner certification before an interlocutory review can
be pressed, and then to allow appeals to be presented when the
examiner finds that the requirements of certification are not met;
but the deterrent impact of the examiner's decision not to certify
must be noted. It may well be concluded from the relatively few appeals (in comparison with the number of administrative proceedings
before examiners) that an SEC examiner's refusal to certify discourages most appeals. The Commission's delegation of authority to the
Director of Opinions and Review to affirm, but not to reverse, the
examiners' ruling-s encourages consistent, well-reasoned decisions.
The rules are still vague on precisely what matters are beyond the
examiner's authority and must be presented directly to the Commission. 54 There does not appear to be any justification for retention of
52. See Table m supra.
53. However, one quarter (four) of the appeals were filed in one proceeding, in
which an applicant sought approval of its acquisition of an electric utility under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. See American Elec. Power Co., SEC Docket !!-1476.
54. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.ll(e), .12(b) (1971).
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this separate procedure, which, at one time, governed all interlocutory appeals. In other words, we think that the Commission's procedures have operated so successfully that they should be pursued
to their next logical conclusion and that all questions should be
ruled upon by the examiner, certified or denied certification by the
examiner, and decided on interlocutory appeal by the Director.

5. Federal Trade Commission
"Problems of delay have vexed the FTC ever since it was established, and some of the most notorious examples of protracted administrative proceedings have occurred in that agency."GG Even with a
declining caseload, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) ponderous investigative and adjudicative proceedings "continue to produce
decisions based on stale and unreliable evidence and to undermine
effective enforcement." 56 This harsh judgment by the American Bar
Association's FTC Study Commission is not a new one. The FTC's
internal operations, including its hearing procedures, have been
thoroughly analyzed and castigated by authorities almost since the
agency's birth.57 It is surprising then, if our recollection is accurate,
that except for former Commissioner Elman's critique, none of these
studies examine the FTC's promiscuous interlocutory practice or
suggest that it contributes substantially to adjudicative delay.us
FTC adjudications are complaint cases; that is, the hearing is
held to determine whether a charged respondent has violated federal
laws proscribing restraints of trade, deceptive practices, or misleading
labels. 59 Although the Commission has authority in many cases to
55. ABA CoMM. To STUDY THE FTC, REPORT 28 (1969) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
56. Id. at 32. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
57. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 55; T. BLAISDELL, THE FTC: AN EXPERIMENT
IN THE CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1924); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH &: J. SCHULZ, THE NADAR RE·
PORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE Co1111111ss10N (1969); Cor.IMN. ON EXECUTIVE Ono., TASK FORCE
ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS app. N (1949); G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION; A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); '.ROBERT HELLER
&: AssOCIATES, INC., FTC MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT (1954); SENATE COMM, ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., !.ANDIS REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELEcr (Comm. Print 1960); U.S. CIVIL SERV, COMMN., EVALUATION OF PERSON•
NEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1965); Auerbach, The Federal Trade
Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1964); Elman,
Administrative Reform: The Federal Trade Commission, in SENATE CoMllt, ON THE
JUDICIARY, 9lsr CONG., lsr SESS., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT
AND RESPONSIVE DEc1s10N-MAKING 122 (Comm. Print 1969); Elman, A. Modest Proposal
for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045 (1970).
58. See authorities cited in note 57 w.pra.
59. For a current list of the stattites that the FTC has been assigned to cnfo,:ce,
see ABA REPORT, supra note 55, at 6-7.
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seek preliminary injunctive relief, it seldom does so. 6° Consequently,
a challenged practice is not directly affected by the adjudicative
hearing until a final order is issued and implemented; and then the
sanction consists of only a proscriptive cease-and-desist order. In
other words, respondents have strong incentives to delay the hearing.
At one time, the FTC's rules placed no restriction on interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings. 61 As examiners were delegated
greater authority, the right to appeal was limited-at least in theory.
For the past few years, interlocutory review has been at the Commission's discretion; the examiner has had no control over it. A cumbersome, two-step procedure must be invoked. 62 First, within five days
after notice of the examiner's interlocutory ruling, the complaining
party must file a request of not more than ten pages for permission
to appeal. 63 "Permission will not be granted except upon a showing
that the ruling complained of involves substantial rights and will
materially affect the final decision, and that a determination of its
correctness before conclusion of the hearing is essential to serve the
interests of justice."64 Although the rules are silent in this regard,
responsive briefs opposing requests to appeal may be filed. 65 Once
permission is granted, the second step becomes the actual appeal.
The appellants are directed to file briefs of not over 30 pages within
five days after permission has been granted; the appellees, within five
days after the appeal brief is served.66 On occasion, the entire Commission has heard oral argument during this second stage, even
though the rules again make no provision for it. 67 The rules do
provide that "[t]he appeal shall not operate to suspend the hearings
unless otherwise ordered by the hearing examiner or the Commis60. In fact, the ITC recently used this power for the first time in eight years.
Medi-Hair Intl., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,442 (FTC 1971). See BNA, ATRR No.
500, at A-13 (Feb. 16, 1971).
61. See 16 C.F.R.

§

3.20(b)(l) (1960).

62. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23 (1971).
63. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971).
64. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971). This language was adopted in fiscal 1968. 33 Fed.
Reg. 7032 (1968). The previous test limited permission to appeal to a showing of
"extraordinary circumstances where an immediate decision by the Commission is clearly
necessary to prevent detriment to the public interest." 16 C.F.R. § 3.20(a) (1967). The
rule change apparently was designed to articulate the factors previously applied under
the public interest test.
65. See, e.g., Koppers Co., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
11 16,879, at 21,023 (FTC 1969).
66. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1971).
67. See, e.g., Suburban Propane Gas Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 1117,965, at 20,336 (FTC 1967).

126

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:109

sion." 68 The routine practice, however, is for the examiner to postpone the proceeding pending interlocutory review.
There are two exceptions to this discretionary review system.
First, the FTC's permission is not required to appeal rulings on
requests for admissions or rulings on compulsory processes. 00 On the
other hand, these appeals will be "entertained" by the FTC only
when the aggrieved party makes the "showing" required for other
interlocutory appeals. 70 Apparently the first step----that is, the petition-to-appeal stage-is dispensed with and the decision whether to
entertain the appeal and whether to grant or deny it is accomplished
on reading the appeal briefs. When this exception was brought to
the attention of staff attorneys and FTC practitioners, they vaguely
recalled it but conceded that they relied upon the two-step approach
in making such appeals.71 In other words, the Commission's experience here is at variance with its rules. The second exception involves
examiner orders to disclose confidential information within the Commission's files or an examiner's suspension of an attorney. 72 Interlocutory review of these sensitive rulings is automatically allowed;
in fact, the decision to release confidential FTC files may be reviewed
on the Commission's own motion if no party complains. 73
These rules were adopted to restrict interlocutory appeals. Review by the FTC is not a right. On the contrary, it is to be granted
only when a stringent test is met-when failure to review is likely
to cause greater delay or unnecessary and substantial harm. 74 Moreover, the Commission, rather than the parties or the examiner, determines whether this test is met. Compliance with its rules, therefore,
would seem simple to assure.
If ever a gap existed between rule and reality, the FTC procedures and practices illustrate it. The number of interlocutory appeals, especially when compared to the number of adjudicative hearings on the docket, is astonishing. The statistics for three fiscal
years are shmm in Table IV. Once again, however, these statistics do not tell the whole story. An interlocutory order issues even
when no appeal from an examiner's ruling is allowed because the
Commission must, in every case, rule on the petition to appeal.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1971).
16 C.F.R. § 3.35(b) (1971).
16 C.F.R. § 3.35(b) (1971).
See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 3
16 C.F.R. §§ 3.36(d)-(e), .42(d) (1971).
16 C.F.R. § 3.36(e) (1971).
16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971).

TRADE

REG. REP. ,i 19,545 (FTC 1971),
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TABLE IV71!
INTERLOCUTORY .APPEALS IN

FTC

HEARINGS

1968
Interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings
Adjudications pending (workload)
Adjudications disposed of by examiners
Adjudications docketed (complaints issued)

80
61
35

23

Fiscal Year
1969

1970

81

116

51

60
22
35

24
23

These orders are not reflected in Table IV when the petition to
appeal is granted. The two-step process means that two orders are
commonly issued when an appeal is allowed. (However, the two
exceptions permitting appeals as a matter of right result in only one
FTC order per interlocutory appeal.) Of course, this does not mean
that all interlocutory orders are equal or that they consume the same
amount of Commission or hearing-examiner time.
There are other more significant aspects to these :figures. First,
the FTC's recordkeeping renders all its statistics suspect. A check
of the listing of interlocutory orders by dates supplied by the Commission staff revealed several errors. Orders were listed when the
Commission issued no order in that docket on that date; other orders
were omitted. These errors could not be corrected since the FTC
maintains no separate record of interlocutory orders and opinions.
These errors in themselves, however, probably do not pose a serious
problem for our study since it does not seem likely that they would
be weighted in one direction; in fact they probably cancel each
other. More importantly, the thrust of this study is a qualitative,
as well as a quantitative, analysis of the Commission's interlocutory
review practice, so that the particular accuracy of any one number
is of little significance. Second, and of more serious consequence, is
the probable substantial overstatement of the number of interlocutory appeals that interfere with adjudicative hearings before an
examiner. Many appeals involve questions of discovery; hence they
do not always delay the proceeding substantially. Even more relate
to post-hearing questions (e.g., requests by the examiner for additional time to prepare his initial decision or requests by the parties
relating to their appeal from the initial decision). These routine requests invariably involve no delay, are decided by the "motions"
Commissioner without coming before the full Commission, and
neither postpone the hearing nor affect the examiner's direction of
it. Therefore, as a check on these statistics, we made an intensive
75. These figures were supplied by the Office of General Counsel of the FTC.
They cannot be reconciled with the FTC's annual reports, however. See, e.g., FTC
ANNUAL REPORT 57 (1970).
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study of all interlocutory appeals decided in the second half of fiscal
1970. Of the 53 interlocutory appeals decided during this interval,
40% did not involve interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Since
this period is probably representative, we think that the number of
interlocutory appeals for these three fiscal years is closer to 160
than to the 277 reported. Our analysis, therefore, is based upon this
discounted figure.
This downward adjustment of figures representing the FTC's
interlocutory interference with adjudicative hearings still leaves an
inordinate number of appeals in comparison with the Commission's
limited adjudicative caseload. Using fiscal 1970 as a baseline, there
were 70 (discounted) interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in
the 60 cases then pending. Yet these statistics substantially understate the role of interlocutory appeals at the FTC, for of the 60
pending cases, 22 were disposed of by the examiner during the year
(and thus were not subject to interlocutory appeal for part of the
period) and 35 involved newly issued complaints (with no opportunity often for either party to have obtained interlocutory relief).
Consequently, there were 70 appeals in the approximately 35 active
cases before FTC examiners in fiscal 1970-an average of two appeals
per active case. This conclusion is supported by a staff study of interlocutory appeals for fiscal years 1966 to 1969, which determined that
72% of the 172 active cases in that period had at least one interlocutory appeal or certification interrupting the proceeding and that
many hearings were subject to multiple interlocutory action. 70 The
significance of these figures and the extraordinary scope of FTC
review of interlocutory rulings is further emphasized when the FTC
statistics are compared with those supplied by other agencies.
Because interlocutory appeals are so numerous and so common,
they cause a significant interruption in FTC adjudications, especially
since hearings are routinely postponed and pretrial activity delayed
pending the Commission's decision. 77 We sought to document this
interference. We discovered that the average delay resulting from
FTC interlocutory appeals during the last half of fiscal 1970 was
only 18 days-that is, the FTC's interlocutory order was filed, on
the average, 18 days after review was first sought. It was found that
15% of these appeals were decided within a week, and only one required more than two months to decide. Thus, individual appeals
are seldom responsible for delaying the proceeding, although several
76. Memorandum from Joseph J. Gercke, Chairman of the FTC Administrative
Proc. &: Rules Comm., to FTC, March 25, 1970, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
77. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 78-80 infra.
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proceedings in which the delay was substantial were encountered.78
The delay and unwarranted interference that staff attorneys and
hearing examiners, as well as most practitioners, complain about is
due, therefore, to the excessive number of appeals in single cases
and the cumulative delay that results. For example, one of the 15
cases with interlocutory appeals decided in the second half of fiscal
1970 was interrupted by 7 interlocutory orders during that
period and by a total of 26 interlocutory orders over a I½ year
period. 70 The case is not sui generis-over half of the cases interrupted in this six-month period were subject to 2 or more interlocutory orders.so
Perhaps the Commission's frequent interlocutory review would
be justified if the appeals expedited proceedings by avoiding prejudicial error and ultimate remand, or if the salutary effects of close
supervision of examiner performance outweighed the costs involved.
Yet such benefits are not apparent from the record. Although almost one quarter of the interlocutory appeals (7 of 30) decided during the period of January to June 1970 resulted in a reversal of the
examiner's ruling, few involved supervision of the examiner's conduct of the hearing. Only four granted discovery to respondent (and
two of these were automatically appealable requests for discoverv
from FTC personnel). Of the other decisions, two modified the confidential protection given sensitive materials, and one allowed a
pleading to be amended. On the other hand, examiners were upheld in almost two thirds of the appeals (19 of 30), most of which
sought additional discovery or reversal of an examiner's refusal to
dismiss a complaint. These latter appeals were often patently frivolous or dilatory. In other cases the Commission continued its
78. In Suburban Propane Gas Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,965, at 20,336 (FTC 1967), the FTC required 15 months to decide which party
had the burden of proof on one critical issue. Because of this and other interlocutory
appeals, a lapse of almost 3 years occurred between issuance of the complaint and
the beginning of the hearing-which was ultimately dismissed. More recently, the
Commission delayed a false advertising hearing for 4½ months, only to deny interlocutory review of an examiner's decision rejecting cross-motions for summary decision.
Union Carbide Corp., FTC Docket 8811 (March 12, 1971) (interlocutory order). Thus,
even after this inordinate delay, neither the examiners nor the parties were advised
of the standards that examiners should apply in ruling upon motions for summary
decision. See also Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 3 _TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,455 (FTC 1971)
(interlocutory order).
79. Koppers Co., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,879, at
21,023 (FTC 1969).
80. Koppers Co., Inc., FTC Docket 8804; Diener's, Inc., FTC Docket 8804; OKC
Corp., FTC Docket 8802; Verranzzano Trading Corp., FTC Docket 8801; American
Brands, Inc., FTC Docket 8799; Sterling Drug, Inc., FTC Docket 8797; Hollywood Credit
Clothing Co., FTC Docket 8796; Eastern Detective Academy, Inc., FTC Docket 8793;
Kennecott Copper Corp., FTC Docket 8765,

,r
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restrictive approach to discovery of information from its files. The
remaining appeals (4 of 30) involved disputes over housekeeping
items (e.g., additional time to seek interlocutory relief) or matters
beyond the examiner's authority (e.g., preliminary injunction in a
merger proceeding).
We strongly concur, therefore, with the judgment of all FTC
examiners, and of most staff or private attorneys, that a rule revision
severely restricting interlocutory review would be a step toward improving the operation of FTC hearings. Interlocutory appeals in
FTC adjudications are today generally unsuccessful; they seldom
involve particularly important matters when they are allowed. A
selective right of appeal would furnish adequate protection in particularly sensitive areas, and a reduction in the number of the FTC'i;
redundant interlocutory opinions would prove no loss. But it must
be noted that interlocutory appeal procedures themselves are of
little significance in the whole picture of FTC adjudications. The
major cause of adjudicative delay at the FTC does not stem from
the interlocutory procedure, but rather is caused by the Commission's unwillingness to open its files for discovery, its uncertainty
with respect to protection of confidential information made available
for trial purposes, and its reluctance either to remove incentives
for delay (i.e., to obtain preliminary injunctive relief) or to punish
delaying tactics.81
6. National Labor Relations Board
Most adversary hearings before the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) concern complaint cases involving unfair labor
practice charges.82 Relief may include reinstatement of an employee
with back pay (and interest), prohibition of future misconduct, or
similar action designed to neutralize the impact of past abuses. 83 As
81. Former FTC Commissioner Elman's trenchant summary is, typically, indicative
and accurate: "[B)y its penchant for secrecy, its refusal to grant respondents adequate
discovery, its intrusion in areas better handled by the hearing examiner, and by its
failure to plan its docket, the [Federal Trade] Commission has vitiated and degraded its
quasi-judicial power." Elman, Administrative Reform: The Federal Trade Commission,
supra note 57, at 160.
82. Representation cases are not included in this study because as a matter of
practice the parties generally do not seek interlocutory review of c."'aminer rulings.
Several reasons are offered in explanation: representation hearings are not truly
adversary; they are investigative; and, most importantly, the regional director's decision
is only the predicate for an election, which may then be challenged to the Board. The
Board's rules, however, do make provision for review of interlocutory rulings by
examiners in representation cases. 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(c) (1971).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). Although the statute does not provide for interest on
back pay, cases do in fact allow it. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F,2d
1008 (5th Cir. 1969); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962),
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with many agencies, the NLRB maintains no separate record of interlocutory appeals; so our report is necessarily fragmentary. Nevertheless, we believe that from the data we collected a representative
picture can be presented.
The NLRB's caseload is heavy. There were, for example, 18,651
unfair labor practice complaints in fiscal 1969.84 However, 92% of
these complaints were disposed of prior to a formal hearing by dismissal, voluntary withdrawal, or settlement of the charge.85 In recent
years, trial examiners have annually issued over 900 initial decisions
in unfair labor practice controversies; and their workload has exceeded 1,400 cases per year.86 To be sure, the hearings are short, generally lasting no more than three or four days, and the amount
in controversy is usually quite limited; that is, the costs of the
hearing and the economic stake in each case are small compared
with those of other agencies (e.g., FCC, FPC, and FTC), although
the hearing is, of course, important to the particular employee and is
usually of concern to his employer or union. In addition, there is no
urge, in most cases, to delay the proceeding. When back pay is in issue
and interest is to be assessed, there would seem to be some inducement for expedition on the part of the employer. On the other hand,
the Board's orders carry no immediate sanction and enforcement is
secured only by petitioning a federal court of appeals.87 Occasionally
the Board asks a district court, under section IOG) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 88 for temporary injunctive relief to stop the
challenged practice pending a hearing.
Despite the NLRB's caseload, only an average of approximately
30 interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in unfair labor
practice cases are filed annually-although the number increased to
45 during the first nine months of 1970.89 From this information
84. NLRB .ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1969).
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. at 9-10, 17.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). See Recommendation 10 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Judidal Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor
Relations Board, in AD. CoNF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1970); Recommendation 18 of
the Administrative Conference of the United States (1961-1962), S. Doc. No. 24, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1963).
88. 29 u.s.c. ,§ 160G) (1964). See NLRB .ANNUAL REPORT 160-64, 238 (1969).
89. Information on interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in unfair labor
practice cases was obtained by searching the daily log and docket files maintained in
the Solicitor's Office, the only record on interlocutory appeals kept by the NLRB.
Since the log begins with January 1, 1968, our information covers only the 2¾ years
between that date and the time the record was made available to us.
The log book, moreover, is not wholly accurate. Before investigating the files we
counted 21 interlocutory appeals in the 2¾ year period. On closer examination, it
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one might expect that the Board's rules or practices strictly limit
the right to seek interlocutory review. In fact, however, they resemble
the FTC's two-step method. The NLRB rules provide that an
examiner's interlocutory orders "shall not be appealed directly to
the Board except by special permission of the Board." 00 Permission
is sought by filing a request with the Board "promptly, in ·writing,
and ... briefly stat[ing] the grounds relied on." 01 Thus, the examiner
plays no role in determining whether interlocutory review will be
granted. The rules imply that the Board will first decide whether
review shall be granted and, once permission is granted, will then
consider the appeal.
As a practical matter, the Board's interlocutory appeal procedure
involves but one step and is handled informally. If interlocutory
review is sought during the hearing, one of the parties will send
its request by telegram to the Board. The information available to
the Board at this stage is scanty; it has only the complaining party's
request, the examiner's ruling, and occasionally an opposing party's
reply. The complaint and other papers are often located elsewhere
since the Board is located in Washington and hearings are held
throughout the country. The Solicitor's Office advises the Board
whether, in its opinion, the request should be allowed. Interlocutory
appeals are decided by a panel of three-not by the entire fivemember Board. At least one Board member is present when the appeal is discussed; the other two generally send a representative from
their legal staff who exercises a proxy vote and later advises his
Board member of the decision. The Board's decision is reached
quickly (usually by accepting the Solicitor's advice), and the parties
are usually advised of the ruling the day after the appeal is received.
This informal system operates efficiently, as it must if the brief unfair
labor practice hearing is not to be delayed. Few interlocutory appeals
cause a hearing to be interrupted, although in our review of the
record we found two cases that delayed proceedings for several
months. Only a very few cases are subjected to more than one
interlocutory appeal.
"We studied the interlocutory appeals to the Board for one 12was clear that many did not involve interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Our
findings, then, by calendar year, were that the Board heard 32 interlocutory appeals
from examiner rulings in 1968, 33 in 1969, and 45 during the first 9 months of 1970.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971).
91. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971).
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month period (calendar year 1969) more intensively. There were 33
appeals in this period. From the records in these cases, which were
often incomplete, we collected the data shown in Table V. The delay
TABLE V
ANALYSIS OF INTERLOCUTORY Al>PEAIS

Complaint charged violation by
Employer
Union
Other
Interlocutory appeal sought by
General Counsel-NLRB
Employer

IN 1969

24
10
2

12
8

20 ..
Board action on interlocutory appeal
Granted
Denied

13
20
33

Board action sustained position of
General Counsel-NLRB
Employer

14
6

20..
Subject matter of interlocutory appeal
Evidentiary ruling
Discovery
Procedural

17
3
13

33
• Three cases involved charges against both employers and unions.
• • Only 20 of the 33 records contained information on these points.

occasioned by interlocutory appeals during this 12-month period
averaged 7 days. This figure, however, is distorted by 2 protracted
appeals; hence, the usual delay appeared to be less than 2 days.
The appeals from procedural rulings were disparate and could not
be otherwise categorized.
NLRB examiners, staff attorneys, and private practitioners we
contacted were generally satisfied with the Board's interlocutory appeal procedure. Proceedings are not inordinately interrupted as a
consequence of this procedure, yet a safety valve is available. The·
competency and experience of the Solicitor's Office is critical; it is
ably staffed. The willingness of the Board to rely upon the decision
of one member and two proxies is considered an essential feature,
although it seems questionable whether the number of interlocutory
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appeals supports this assertion and whether this informal delegation
does not in fact exceed congressional authorization.02 The significance of interlocutory review is reduced by NLRB rule provisions
explicitly permitting review of an examiner's interlocutory rulings
"if exception to the ruling or order is included in the statement of
exceptions filed with the Board." 03 The cost of remand and retrial,
which such procedure might necessitate, is less significant when
the entire proceeding consumes less than a week of trial time.
The most important-and most limiting-feature of the Board's interlocutory appeal practice, however, is the restricted scope of the
subject matter. Interlocutory questions appealed in the usual manner
to the Board seldom involve complex or novel questions. Decisions
are made without briefs and upon a sparse synopsis of the case. Consequently, the adaptability of the NLRB's procedure to agencies with
more complex proceedings is questionable. Nevertheless, its consideration by agencies with substantial caseloads and relatively simple
hearings seems advisable.

7. Summary
This survey of six agencies suggests that interlocutory appeals
have not, in themselves, substantially contributed to delay of administrative proceedings. The possible exception is the FTC where, although individual appeals are handled expeditiously in most cases,
the number of appeals is so overwhelming that the cumulative delay
is substantial. It may be, however, that self-selection has operated to
minimize the impact of interlocutory appeals within the agencies we
studied. First, this study concentrated on the independent regulatory
agencies, whose procedures tend to be the most sophisticated. What
is true of their interlocutory procedures may not follow in other
agencies. Second, our study was limited. It sought to measure the
impact of interlocutory review from the available records, which
were seldom complete. A true measure of interlocutory appeals
should not stop with a review of selected representative cases and
qualitative interviews with agency personnel and practitioners. The
92. Authority to delegate review functions to an employee board has been granted
to the ICC (49 U.S.C. § 17 (1964)); to the FCC (47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(l) (1964)); to the
CAB (49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1964)); to the FTC (Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1961, 75 Stat, 838,
following 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964)); to the Federal Maritime Commn, (46 U.S.C. § llll
(1964)); and to the SEC (15 U.S.C. §78d-l (1964)).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971).
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cost of a more extended study, however, did not appear to be worth
the likely gain.
Even if the interlocutory appeal procedures of most agencies are
tolerable, useful recommendations can still be offered. The FCC and
SEC, whose interlocutory appeal procedures appear sound and sensible in most respects, frequently deny their examiners authority to
rule initially on interlocutory questions, even though they are already familiar with the issues being raised. These agencies also permit the parties to reargue interlocutory motions in each case by
briefs to the review authority, thus permitting unnecessary delay.
The FPC and CAB have virtually eliminated interlocutory appeals,
but perhaps at too high a cost to a free adversary exchange. The
FTC's procedures are overly complex and are apparently ignored
in actual practice. Despite formally restrictive procedures, interlocutory review by the FTC is almost automatic. The NLRB's informal
methods do not seem adaptable to agencies with more complex
cases.
On the other hand, the experience of these six agencies indicates
that they are increasingly delegating to their hearing examiners
additional authority to decide initially all questions and to control
(in most cases) the availability of interlocutory review. Consequently,
fewer matters are being appealed to review authorities during initial
agency proceedings. When kept within reasonable limits, this development has improved the level of agency hearings. Although there
are exceptions, it seems clear that this process should be encouraged
and extended.
·

Ill.

THE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE WITH

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW

The direction of federal court experience with interlocutory
appeals contrasts with that of the agencies. The tendency in the
courts has been to broaden rather than narrow the opportunity for
interlocutory review. However, the independence of federal district judges has never been in doubt, and any change expanding appellate review of interlocutory rulings is narrowly curtailed by strict
standards and by the discretion of both the trial and appellate courts.
The starting point for understanding the judicial analogue is the
final judgment rule, which provides that an appeal may be taken
only from a final decision and not from an interlocutory ruling. 94
94. E.g., 6 MooRE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE

1-292 (2d ed. 1966); C.

WRIGHT, FEDERAL
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This rule not only seeks to prohibit interim appeals that a final
decision may make moot, but also reflects a basic decision regarding
the proper relationship between trial and appellate courts. The trial
judge is independent and most of his decisions are not subject to
check and reconsideration. 95 "Appeal gives the upper court a power
to review, not one of intervention." 06
The final judgment rule has always been subject to exceptions.
On the one hand, there are the prerogative ·writs-prohibition and
mandamus. 97 These writs are designed primarily to control a trial
court's abuse of its jurisdiction.98 On the other hand, there are several statutory exceptions that authorize an immediate challenge to
"orders of serious, perhaps irreparable consequence." 90 The traditional interlocutory order freely subject to immediate appellate review (by statutory directive) is the ruling on a party's request for
preliminary injunctive relief. Neither procedure, however, is closely
related to most interim rulings by agency hearing examiners. The
agency initially determines the scope of its jurisdiction when the
case is docketed, and in any event the issue of jurisdiction is seldom
within the examiner's province.100 Similarly, administrative agencies
apparently do not have a trial court's power to issue peremptory
interlocutory orders.101
There is one limitation on the final judgment rule that does
relate to agency review of interlocutory orders issued by a trial
examiner. Congress modified the final judgment rule by enacting
the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958.102 This Act empowers any
COURTS §§ 101-02, at 452-63 (1970); Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis for Appeal,
41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS L.
REv. 292 (1966); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV, L. REv. 351 (1961).
While a few states, notably New York, depart from the final judgment rule and
generally allow appeals from interlocutory orders, they do not allow appeals during
the course of a trial. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 (1965).
95. See Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations,
70 COLOM. L. REv. 1292, 1302 (1970).
96. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
97. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 94, § 102, at 461-62.
98. Id.
99. Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a) (1964); 11 U.S.C. §§ 47-48 (1964).
100. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.29l(a)(2) (1971).
101. See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) (dictum). See generally I K.
DAVIS, ADI'lfiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.11, at 212-15 (1958); W, GELLHORN &: C, BYSE,
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 610-11 (4th ed. 1960).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964). See Bourdeaux, Federal Interlocutory Appeals ActA Five Year View, 35 MISS. L.J. 55 (1963); Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of

November 1971]

Administrative Hearings

137

district judge to certify for immediate appeal an order "not otherwise appealable" if in his opinion the order involves a "controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and [in which] an immediate appeal ... may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 103 The grant of
permission to appeal-even though certified by the district court-is
further subject to the discretion of the court of appeals. 104 District
courts understandably have not been overly sympathetic to claims
of error. Neither have they been easily persuaded that the order
involves a "controlling question of law" or that immediate appeal
will speed the final determination.105 It is not surprising, then, that
this exception has not been of much importance. Indeed, in only
about 1/10 of 1% of all cases filed in the district courts do trial judges
certify an interlocutory ruling to the court of appeals.106 It is, at
most, a crack in the otherwise impenetrable wall insulating trial
court procedures from appellate review.
Even with these exceptions, the practical effect of the final judgment rule is that many (probably most) areas of procedure are largely
the domain of trial court law. This is true of the law governing pretrial procedures as well as that concerning the conduct of the trial.
This fact puts great responsibility on the trial courts in these areas;
the consensus is that "in the federal system, at any rate, this is probably not misplaced."107

IV.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overriding lesson from this study is that agencies have been
unnecessarily reluctant to delegate sufficient authority to their examiners. Immediate reconsideration of discovery orders and review
1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959); Note, Section 1292 (b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion,
54 GEO. L.J. 940 (1966).
103. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1964). The court of appeals is not required to accept the
appeal. Section 1292(b) provides, rather, that after the appeal is certified the court of
appeals "may ••• in its discretion ••. permit" it to be taken.
104. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J ll0.22[4], at 264-65 (2d ed. 1970).
105. E.g., A. Olinick&: Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439,443 (2d Cir. 1966).
See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON FED. RULES OF PROC., REPORT, 38 F.R.D. 95, 104 (1965).
106. Out of over 80,000 civil cases pending in the district courts during fiscal 1969,
only 101 interlocutory appeals were certified, and the courts of appeal allowed the
challenge to the trial court's ruling in only 64 of these cases. By contrast, over 10,000
appeals from final judgments were taken to the courts of appeal in this same period.
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1969, at
108; id., 1970, at ll7, 195.
107. F. JAMES, supra note 94, at 53.
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of trial rulings are not exceptional and when such frequent interruptions are permitted, the results are not impressive. Hearings are
not expedited; irreparable harm is not necessarily avoided; and uniformity of hearing practices is not ensured. However, when hearing
examiners are granted authority to rule on all interlocutory questions
and to control the general availability of interlocutory review, hearings are expedited and fairness is usually preserved. Occasional exceptions exist, of course. The NLRB's informal yet freely available
interlocutory review is a prime example of a successful deviation
from this model.108 Application of the NLRB's approach to other
agencies seems unlikely because of its dependence on an exceptionally
experienced and able solicitor, delegation of decision authority by
proxy to the members' staffs, relatively simple cases, and the pressure
of time. Hence, unless an agency's hearing structure and personnel
present circumstances comparable to those of the NLRB, the formalized procedures of other agencies are likely to be a better guide. As
our recommendations illustrate, we think there are features in almost
every agency's rules worth emulating. On the other hand, the rules
of no one agency embody all our recommendations. .
I£ the past is prologue, the central features of an agency's interlocutory appeal practice should incorporate two principles: broad
delegation of authority to the presiding officer to decide initially all
interlocutory questions and final authority in the presiding officer,
except in extraordinary cases, to control whether interlocutory appeal shall be available. Exceptions to these principles should be
narrowly identified in the rules. Also important is agency adoption
of a general practice of not postponing the hearing pending review,
of deciding the appeal on the record made before the examiner, and,
when authorized, of delegating authority to its staff to confirm the
examiner's ruling. Our recommendations seek to implement these
conclusions.
Several additional suggestions should also be considered.10° First,
there is little reason for an agency to follow a different interlocutory
procedure because of the subject of the appeal. Different techniques
within one agency can seldom be justified. The uses by the FTC of
108. See pt. II. B. 6. supra. The FCC's record shows that only limited restraints on
interlocutory appeals may be applied by other means. Its recent move allowing hearing
examiners to control most interlocutory appeals suggests, however, that this alternative
is unnecessarily costly.
109. They did not warrant inclusion in the official recommendations of the Ad·
ministrative Conference, however.
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a two-step process for most appeals and a one-step procedure for
others110 ( especially when the practice is to treat them identically)
cannot be rationally justified. Confusion without any corresponding
benefit is the result. Moreover, special procedures are usually buried
within the practice rule relating to the subject of the appeal rather
than included in other interlocutory appeal rules. Sound management suggests that an agency separate its appellate rules, whether
interlocutory or final, from other practice rules, and that one section
contain all rules governing appeal procedures.111
Second, many agencies do not maintain adequate records of interlocutory appeals. For example, the ICC simply has no knowledge of
how many interlocutory appeals are sought or decided annually, and,
consequently, no knowledge of whether interim review constitutes a
serious or immaterial interference in a substantial number of its
hearings. Likewise, it does not have any information on what subjects, if any, are the current sore spots causing most of the intermediate appeals. If administrative procedures are to remain abreast
of continuing developments, some mechanism needs to be developed
for determining where the problems are and what they cost. To
date, recordkeeping is the only viable solution.112 It is not suggested
that agencies establish massive record retention or information retrieval systems solely for measuring the impact of interlocutory review. Where these systems do exist, they should include information
on interlocutory appeals. Otherwise, a simple index of all interlocutory appeals, cross-referenced by subject matter, case title, and
docket number, should prove adequate. If possible, other information should also be recorded. For instance, obtaining data for this
study would have been relatively simple if agencies had maintained
110. See text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.
111. The Conference is not totally blameless in this connection. Its summary
decision and discovery recommendations suggest three separate tests. Recommendation 20 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Summary Dedsion in
Agency Adjudication § 5, in An. CoNF. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1971); Recommendation 21 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Discovery in Administrative Adjudication ,i,i 2(6), 7(b), in id. at 44. This inconsistency was pointed
out to the Conference but to no effect. Proceedings of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Fourth Plenary Session 89 (June 2, 1970). See also Gellhorn &:
Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 612,
629 n.88 (1971).
112. Senator Edward V. Long, one of the authors of the act establishing the
Administrative Conference, did suggest an "ombudsman" role for the Conference, but
this suggestion has not been implemented. Long, Public Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1966, § 7, at 54 (Book Review). In any case, it would be a costly alternative when
agencies could monitor their own procedures.
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records showing what delay or time-saving resulted from the interim
appeal, which party sought the appeal, and whether the examiner's
interlocutory ruling was affirmed. This suggestion is consistent with
(and arguably required by) amended section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act,113 and probably would be unnecessary if agencies
complied with another recommendation of the Administrative Conference.114
Finally, these records should be used by agencies to monitor their
procedures. Periodic self-analysis by the agency, if possible with the
assistance of interested and informed outsiders, is probably the only
way an agency can be certain that its rules of practice respond to
current needs.115 Many agencies have already taken this tack.110
The Administrative Conference of the United States made the
following recommendation at its Fifth Plenary Session:
Recommendation: Interlocutory Appeal Procedures
Interlocutory appeal procedures for agency review of rulings
by presiding officers must balance the advantages derived from immediate correction of an erroneous ruling against interruption of
the hearing process and other costs of piecemeal review. Striking an
appropriate balance 9etween these competing concerns requires that
the exercise of discretion in individual cases be carefully circumscribed. Procedures that delegate the responsibility for allowing interlocutory appeals to presiding officers, with a reserved power in the
agency to handle exceptional situations, have proven most satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATION 117
Each agency which handles a substantial volume of cases that
113. Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public inspection and
copying a cu1Tent index providing identifying information for the public as to any
matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or published. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
114. Recommendation 14 of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings by Federal Departments and
Agencies, in An. CONF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 43.44 (1970),
115. See Recommendation 14, supra note 114, § 5, at 44.
116. See FTC Advisory Council on Rules of Practice, 36 Fed. Reg. 4728 (March 11,
1971).
117. An. CoNF. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 50-51 (1971). This recommendation supersedes
§ 5 of Recommendation 20 and 1111 2(6) and 7(b) of Recommendation 21, adopted June
2-3, 1970, insofar as they deal with interlocutory appeals. See note 111 supra and
accompanying text.
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are decided on the basis of a record should adopt interlocutory appeal procedures based on the following principles:
I. Presiding officers should be authorized to rule initially on
all questions raised in the proceedings. A ruling by the presiding
officer, supported by a reasoned statement, usually should precede
interlocutory review of the question raised.
2. In general, interlocutory appeal from a ruling of the presiding officer should be allowed only when the presiding officer certifies
that (a) the ruling involves an important question of law or policy
concerning which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion; and (b) an immediate appeal from the ruling will materially
advance the ultimate termination of the proceeding or subsequent
review will be an inadequate remedy.
3. Allowance of an interlocutory appeal should not stay the
proceeding unless the presiding officer determines the extraordinary
circumstances require a postponement. A stay of more than 30 days
must be approved by the review authority.
4. If the number of interlocutory appeals in an agency is substantial, the authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the presiding
officer's interlocutory ruling should be delegated, to the extent permitted by law, to a review authority designated by the agency.
5. Unless the review authority orders othenvise in the particular case, the review authority should decide the interlocutory appeal on the record and briefs or oral argument. The review authority should summarily dismiss an interlocutory appeal whenever it
determines that the presiding officer's certification was improvidently
granted or that consideration of the appeal is unnecessary. If the review authority does not specify othenvise within 30 days after the
certification or allowance of the interlocutory appeal, leave to appeal from the presiding officer's interlocutory ruling should be
deemed to be denied.
6. Interlocutory review by petition to the review authority without certification by the presiding officer should be restricted to exceptional situations in which (a) vital public or private interests
might othenvise be seriously impaired, and (b) the review authority
has not had an opportunity to develop standards which the presiding officer can apply in determining whether interlocutory review is
appropriate.

The first recommendation, that all interlocutory questions be
ruled upon first by the presiding officer, is a necessary predicate of
sound trial management. The examiner must be in control of the
proceeding assigned to him. It is inconsistent, at best, to deny an
examiner the authority to rule on interlocutory issues yet, at the
same time, expect him to direct discovery and expedite the hearing.
He is in the best position to know the case fully, to appreciate
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whether the ruling effectively implements the agency's purpose, and
to ensure that the ruling meets the requirements of fairness and
expedition at the trial level. This does not mean that only the examiner can provide such guidance and that, therefore, he should be
the final authority. On the other hand, it does seem myopic to pass
interlocutory questions to a higher authority without first obtaining
the views of the presiding officer. Although agencies generally have
reserved some questions for their exclusive consideration, we can
see no justification for denying initial consideration by the examiner
as long as the case is assigned to him.118 The slight costs of delegation
of authority to the examiner are the following: (I) the arguments
the parties would otherwise address to the review authority are made
to the examiner (but the arguments, briefs, and the examiner's ruling
are included in the record if the appeal is certified); and (2) requiring
the examiner's ruling will take additional time. The substantial
benefits from this recommended procedure are the following: (I) the
examiner is in a position to develop consistent, informed decisions
since he is likely to be expert on the procedural questions that dominate interlocutory review; 119 (2) the examiner's ruling will avoid
many appeals and dissuade others; (3) the review authority's time is
freed for consideration of more significant policy questions; and (4)
the review authority has the benefit of the examiner's guidance on
the questions that are appealed.
The second recommendation-that interlocutory appeals generally be limited to questions certified to the review authority by the
examiner-is the core of this proposal. Not surprisingly, hearing
examiners uniformly urge that they be delegated this authority.
Their argument is not persuasive, however. In their frank desire to
emulate the position and prestige of federal district court judges,
they contend that they must be given commensurate power. If
reliance is placed upon a principle at the opposite pole of Lord
Acton's famous dictum,120 it is undoubtedly true that at some point
the failure to delegate authority to a hearing examiner will impair
his performance. Where this minimum authority level is remains un118. Before the matter is assigned to an examiner, or once the case is no longer
on the examiner's docket, "interlocutory questions" (e.g., extensions of time for filing
appeal briefs) should be addressed to the review authority.
119. It is not uncommon for an agency to be unaware of its prior interlocutory rulings. See, e.g., Gellhom, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal
Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 429 n.153 (1968).
120. "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely," Letter to
Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887).
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clear, but authority to control access to intermediate appeals hardly
appears to be the cut off point.121 In any event, this recommendation
rests upon another, more persuasive argument. The recommendation's primary justification is experience. Agencies relying upon their
examiners to limit access to interlocutory review have, in general,
suffered fewer hearing interruptions and have benefited from speedier hearings. The examiner is in charge; he controls the scope of
discovery and the direction of the trial.
The standard for certification of interlocutory ;rulings by the
examiner-the focus of the Administrative Conference's second recommendation-is unexceptional. With two major modifications, it
hews closely to the judicial standard set forth in section 1292(b).122
The more restrictive judicial standard of a "controlling question of
law" is expanded to include important questions of both policy and
law.123 This change reflects the policy function of an agency hearing
and suggests that policy questions may deserve interim agency guidance. On the other hand, the basic standard contemplates three types
of rulings that are also covered by the judicial analogue: (I) those
which are novel or without precedent and about wh~ch there could
be a difference of opinion; (2) those which take a position contrary
to prior agency authority; and (3) those which conform with a prior
agency position but might now be challenged on a new ground.124
The other significant alteration we suggest to the judicial standard
is to authorize immediate review when subsequent consideration by
the review authority would be an inadequate remedy, even though
immediate review would not necessarily advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This modification is designed to reach important interlocutory questions that would become moot if immediate appeal is not available or that otherwise would not constitute
prejudical error.125
The third recommendation seeks to assure that, even when
allowed, interlocutory review will not delay agency hearings. The
purpose here is to minimize delay. In line with other provisions
in these recommendations, we suggest that primary authority for
121. The FCC's successful experience with freely available appeals to its Review
Board is the most obvious rebuttal case in point. See pt. II. n. 1 supra.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964). See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.·
123. See text following note 117 supra.
124. See Note, supra note 102, at 948.
125. E.g., orders authorizing discovery, disclosing confidential information, denying
a privilege, or setting the time and place of hearing.
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staying the proceeding for 30 days should be delegated to the
presiding officer. If a further extension is warranted, not only the
examiner's but also the review authority's approval must be obtained.126 This provision eliminates inadvertent delay. Delay will
occur only when the agency consciously accepts it. A corollary requirement, which all agencies appear to have satisfied (and therefore
is not included in this recommendation), is that a time limit be
specified within which the objecting party must file its interlocutory
appeal from the challenging ruling.
The fourth recommentation is suggested by the Administrative
Conference's earlier alternative recommendation that agencies with
a substantial adjudicative caseload should delegate review authority
to an employee board.127 The experience of the FCC and SEC supports this proposal. Its effect is to enhance the examiner's position
and yet to provide, insofar as structure can, a method for expediting
most appeals. A review board also insulates the adjudicative process
from commission interference until the final appeal, and frees the
commissioners (at least in part) from adjudicative restrictions until
the case is before them. On balance, we prefer the FCC approach of
delegating to the Review Board the power both to affirm and to reverse the examiner. This approach leaves the agency free of all
interim adjudicative responsibility. The Review Board is better
equipped to render consistent, soundly reasoned opinions on the
technical procedural questions that dominate interlocutory appeals.
The alternative SEC approach of limiting the employee board
to affirming the examiner's ruling is satisfactory, however, and is
logically consistent with the Conference's prior "certiorari" review
recommendation.128
126. This requirement limiting the examiner's authority to delay the proceeding is
not inconsistent with our earlier recommendation increasing the e.xaminer's decisional
power. Here the restriction is designed to focus the review authority's attention on the
delay resulting from the interlocutory appeal. Moreover, this requirement dovetails
with 1J 5 of the recommendation that permission to appeal from the e.xaminer's
decision is automatically denied after 30 days unless the review authority specifically
rules otherwise. See text following note 117 supra.
127. See Recommendation 6 of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency,
in AD. CoNF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 38-39 (1970); Freedman, supra note 4.
128. See Recommendation 6, supra note 127. See also Recommendation 9 of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (1961-1962), S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 153-63 (1963); Auerbach, Scope of Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies
To Delegate Decision Making to Hearing Examiners, 48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 823 (1964). For
another variant, which would delegate authority to affirm to the chief examiner, sec
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Com•
mission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 113, 182-83 (1968).

November 1971]

Administrative Hearings

145

The fifth recommendation deals with simple housekeeping rules
of practice that only a few agencies currently apply. 129 Briefly stated,
it generally requires the parties to make their only argument to the
examiner-and to stand by that argument-and imposes a time limit
on interlocutory interruptions. It sacrifices a party's opportunity to
respond to the examiner's ruling; however, the impact of this proposal can cut in both directions, since it likewise prevents the appellee from shoring up an examiner's erroneous justification. The
time saved by this procedure, in addition to the fact that each party
has an opportunity during review of the examiner's initial decision
to challenge the interlocutory ruling, further justifies this approach.
Finally, this recommendation incorporates the double-discretion standard governing interlocutory appeals in the federal courts. Under
this approach, an interlocutory appeal is subject to the discretion of
both the presiding officer and the review authority; either can deny
or grant permission to appeal, except that the review authority, of
course, has the final word.
Since power needs restraint, the sixth recommendation incorporates a safety-valve procedure by allowing the review authority, in
exceptional circumstances, to accept interlocutory appeals that an
examiner refuses to certify. In implementing this recommendation,
each agency should carefully spell out these categorical exceptions.
Otherwise, they can become the exceptions that destroy this proposal.
V.

CONCLUSION

If adopted, these recommendations will alter the relationship
between some agencies and their hearing examiners. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) seeks to assure that an examiner is independent, that his initial decision will be based on the facts in the
record, and that the hearing-at least if required to be decided on the
record-will maintain the basic fairness markings of a judicial trial.
The APA's structural protections are unnecessarily burdensome,
however, unless the examiner is in complete charge of the proceeding
assigned to him. If the agency may freely interrupt and review every
move he makes, the statutory mandate is duplicative. Unrestricted
interlocutory review creates a dual system of hearings, with little
independence or discretion left to the hearing officer. If, on the other
hand, interlocutory review is sensitively restrained, the trial exam129. This proposal is patterned, in part, after two CAB and FPC rules. 14 C.F.R.
§ 302.18(£) (1971); 18 C.F.R. § l.28(a) (1971).
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iner can shape and determine the conduct of the proceeding without
impairing the fairness of the hearing. That, in essence, is the object
of this proposal.

